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SHAW FOR THE UTOPIANS, 

CAPEK FOR THE ANTI-UTOPIANS 

The continuing argument between utopian writers who prefigure the 
Millennium and the anti-utopian writers who prophesy the approach of 
Armageddon is generally assumed to be a struggle between wide-eyed 
optimism and misanthropic pessimism. But the profoundest thinkers in 
each camp sometimes find, after a prolonged engagement with their 
dialogic opposites, that their tents are pitched on common ground-that 
a Hegelian synthesis has occurred wherein the seemingly irreconcilable 
positions have merged into a guarded but life-affirming optimism. One 
such reconciliation can be found in the dramatic dialogue between 
Bernard Shaw, representing the utopians, and Karel Capek (1890­
1938), a Czech anti-utopian writer with Luddite tendencies and conser­
vative religious views who respected Shaw's work but disagreed with 
some of its deepest philosophical underpinnings. They began working 
out their different visions of humanity's future independently, both 
weighing the unprecedented destructive ferocity of World War I against 
the great promise of the early twentieth century's technological advances 
and exploring humanity's prospects in a utopian-dystopian format. 
Both also employed their own variations on biblical themes--Creation, 
Armageddon, and the achievement of the Millennium-to illustrate 
their different conclusions. Eventually, however, they were drawn into a 
dialogue that focused on a question central to utopian and anti-utopian 
discourse: Should humanity strive for a secular millennium, struggling 
to re-create man and society into the image suggested by our brightest 
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hopes, or should we content ourselves with the status quo and wait 
patiently for divine orchestration to work out our destiny? 
Their essential disagreement on this point stems in part from their 
very different concepts of humankind's progress. As J. L. Wisenthal 
explains in his study of Shaw's dialectic dramatic method, "His perspec­
tive is evolutionary, and he thinks in terms of progress toward goals 
rather than their actual attainment. In an evolutionary world no stage is 
final, and in a neo-Lamarckian evolutionary world the human will is 
always aiming at something higher."1 In contrast to this evolutionary 
outlook, Capek agrees with the prophet of Ecclesiastes that there is 
nothing new under the sun, and he found evidence for this belief even 
in a London art museum. In his Letters from England, written after his 
trip there in 1924, he wrote, "How awful a discovery to find the 
perfection of man even at the very beginning of existence; to find it in 
the formation of the first stone arrow, to find it in a Bushman drawing . 
. . . [D]readful is the relativity of culture and history; nowhere behind 
us or before us is there a point of rest, of an ideal, of the finish and 
perfection of man; for it is everywhere and nowhere, and every spot in 
space and time where man has set up his work is unsurpassable."2 There 
could hardly be a more radical divergence of perspective than this, 
and it led the two writers to present very different interpretations of 
humanity's distant past and hypothetical future, especially when they 
became aware of each other's work and squared off for a theological 
battle. Nevertheless, the first arguments in the debate did not begin 
as such. 
Between 1918 and 1920 Shaw labored on an immense work, a five­
play cycle called Back to Methuselah, in an effort to provide a modern 
credible religion that could guide us all out of the error and folly that 
seemed to have brought us so close to the edge of doom during the 
Great War. The resulting work was his "metabiological pentateuch" 
which begins "In the Beginning" with a re-working of the Genesis myth 
and extends "As Far as Thought Can Reach" to a far-distant future 
when humankind has evolved into god-like Ancients who live for centu­
ries in their serene, intensely intellectual utopia. Although Shaw's history 
of humankind recognizes the power-mad, wantonly destructive Cain 
element in our early stages, he shows how the truly vital, creative 
element finally prevails and pulls humanity onward and upward straight 
past the tidy millennia! societies that the socialist utopian reformers were 
dreaming about. The last play of the cycle, As Far as Thought Can Reach, 
ends with a prophecy that some super-evolved humanity, discarding the 
bodies that encumber it, will eventually spread to populate the stars. 
Although many critics objected that the utopia of Shaw's Ancients is 
not a very appealing goal to strive for and that Back to Methuselah only 
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demonstrated Shaw's misanthropy, Shaw seriously intended to offer 
modern man hope that through willing ourselves to be better, we could 
ascend the evolutionary ladder from the Yahoo to the Houyhnhnm stage 
of intellectual and spiritual development. Thus understood, Shaw's 
Creative Evolution is probably the brightest optimism that could be 
maintained in the aftermath of Neo-Darwinism and the Great War. 
In 1920, the same year Shaw finished his utopian pentateuch, Capek, 
writing in Czechoslovakia, finished his first anti-utopian play, R. U.R. 
(Rossum's Universal Robots), wherein he, like Shaw, evaluates twentieth­
century millennial ambitions and Apocalyptic fears employing a modern 
version of biblical motifs. In Capek's own words, he meant to write "a 
comedy, partly of science, partly of truth. The old inventor, Mr. Rossum 
. . . is no more or less than a typical representative of the scientific 
materialism of the last century. His desire to create an artificial man-in 
the chemical and biological, not the mechanical sense-is inspired by a 
foolish and obstinate wish to prove God to be unnecessary and absurd. 
Young Rossum is the modern scientist, untroubled by metaphysical 
ideas; scientific experiment is to him the road to industrial production, 
he is not concerned to prove, but to manufacture."s 
This scenario develops into a dark cautionary tale. Young Rossum, 
hoping to free humanity from toil and establish a leisurely millennial 
society on android labor-and to make a fortune in the process-is at 
first phenomenally successful. But the utopian scheme creates too much 
leisure and renders humans obsolete. Recognizing this, the robots rise 
up and destroy humanity, then realize that they too soon face extinction 
because they are not designed for reproduction. Yet the play ends with 
a life-affirming miracle as two of the robots metamorphose into love­
struck humans. Ending where Back to Methuselah begins, this Adam and 
Eve go forth to renew and repopulate the earth. 
Although the central concerns of Back to Methuselah and R.U.R. are 
very different, both feature automatons that are created in a laboratory 
to resemble human flesh and intellect very closely-more "androids" in 
the current use of the term than the metallic, mechanical beings usually 
implied by the term "robot" (a Capek-coined word from the Czech 
"robota" for "forced labor, drudgery"), although the robots hold a much 
more central position in Capek's play. In Methuselah the automatons 
appear in only one scene of the last play of the cycle, As Far as Thought 
Can Reach, and they live only briefly before they turn vicious, kill their 
creator, and then die. In Capek's play, however, the robot revolution 
easily upstages the human characters' petty concerns, giving the play a 
more "science fiction" feel and a more coherent focus than Shaw's 
eclectic, rambling chronicle could achieve. 
Despite their differences, the two plays were linked in the public's 
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consciousness when, in 1922, both were given their American debut (it 
was a world premiere for Methuselah) by New York's Theatre Guild­
Shaw's in February and March, Capek's in October. One reviewer with 
the New York Herald noticed an affinity between the two plays immedi­
ately, observing that R. U.R. "has as many social implications as the most 
handy of the Shavian comedies," while a reviewer with the New l'Ork 
American goes so far as to assert (rather snidely) that "Bernard Shaw did 
not write R . U.R . but he probably will. Possibly later on we shall have a 
variation of R.U.R . by Mr. Shaw and then what we accepted last night as 
an exceedingly enjoyable and imaginative fantasy will become a dull 
diatribe. "4 Yet the two playwrights who were being discussed together in 
New York both insisted later that they remained unaware of each other's 
work for some time, and the evidence seems to support this. 
R.U.R.'s principal motif-man-made automatons that try to overthrow 
their creators-<:an be traced back to much earlier influences. One 
obvious possibility is the medieval Jewish folk-tale of the Golem, a clay 
manikin brought to life through cabalistic magic to defend the Jews of 
the Prague ghetto. Since a German film version of this legend was being 
shown widely in Czechoslovakia in 1920, the year Capek wrote R .U.R. , 
its influence on the play seems probable.5 Another obvious precedent is 
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein (the New York TiTMS critic titled his review "A 
Czecho-Slovak Frankenstein"). Probably the closest previous literary 
precedent, however, describes, like Capek's play, a society that reaches 
for the utopian ideal of universal leisure by relegating most of the labor 
to manufactured automatons: Edward Bulwer-Lytton's anti-utopian 
novel, The Coming Race (1871). Although we can only speculate whether 
Capek may have had access to this novel, precedents for his robots are 
certainly in evidence. When Bulwer-Lytton's narrator first encounters 
the highly advanced society several miles underground, he reports, "In 
all service, whether in or out of doors, they make great use of automaton 
figures, which are so ingenious, and so pliant to the operations of Vril 
[an energy source], that they actually seem gifted with reason. It was 
scarcely possible to distinguish the figures I beheld, apparently guiding 
or superintending the rapid movements of vast engines, from the 
human forms endowed with thought."6 
We do know that Shaw was familiar with Bulwer-Lytton's novel, and 
he tells us in a speech he delivered to the Fabians in 1933 that he 
borrowed from it the idea that one possible key to a utopian society is 
"mutually assured destruction" at the personal level-that is, if each 
member of society could kill with a thought, that society would have to 
make sure it arranged its institutions carefully so that all members would 
be content with their lot, and the race would have to develop a high 
degree of self-control and a horror of killing or it would self-destruct in 
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short order.7 We see this awful power being demonstrated on a small 
scale in the fourth play of the Methuselah cycle, Tragedy of an Elderly 
Gentleman, just before Shaw's "coming race" finally decides that it must 
humanely but implacably exterminate the more primitive species of 
humanity that has failed to evolve this power Uust as Capek's robots 
decide to exterminate the human race). Although Bulwer-Lytton draws 
a utopia that many socialist reformers (including Shaw) would approve 
of, his anti-utopian message-that humankind is constitutionally incapa­
ble of either establishing or living in such a perfect society-would 
appeal more to Capek, as he makes clear in his later dystopian works. 
It is important to note, however, that even at this early stage of his 
career, Capek seemed to be working with the same biblical motifs Shaw 
used in his utopian works, and the plot similarities that result between 
R.U.R. and Methuselah are striking, particularly in their revision of 
Genesis. For example, Capek's robotic Adam and Eve prove their worthi­
ness to take on the grave responsibility of regenerating the species by 
demonstrating their willingness to die for each other-in a scene with 
parallels in Shaw's In the Beginning and As Far as Thought Can Reach. The 
scene is pivotal in Capek's play, providing the deus ex machina device 
that prevents a species-wide tragedy as God mercifully decides to give 
humankind a second chance despite the disastrous effects of our greed 
and hubris. Just as the last remaining human, Alquist, has completely 
given up hope of rediscovering the lost robot formula and despairs that 
life will perish from the earth, he discovers that a young robot couple, 
Helena and Primus, seem to have developed a crucial human quality: 
they are in love with each other. They don't know what is happening to 
them, but it is clear to the audience from their behavior and is proven 
in a classic test when Alquist tells them he must dissect one of them to 
save the robot race, and each begs to be the sacrificial victim so that the 
other might live. Finally Primus declares "I won't allow it. You won't kill 
either of us, old man .... We-we-belong to each other." Alquist then 
sends the pair out into the world with a benediction: "Go, Adam. Go, 
Eve-be a wife to him. Be a husband to her, Primus." In case we did not 
catch the biblical allusion, Alquist proceeds to read from Genesis: "And 
God saw every thing that he had made, and, behold, it was very good." 
This receives special emphasis because it is Capek's principal theme, in 
this and all of his anti-utopian works. Alquist voices Capek's challenge to 
the worshipers of technology when he asks (rhetorically, since they are 
all dead), "[G]reat inventors, what did you ever invent that was great 
when compared to that girl, to that boy, to this first couple who have 
discovered love, tears, beloved laughter, the love of husband and wife?" 
Finally, on his knees, Alquist thanks God that his eyes have "beheld Thy 
deliverance through love, and life shall not perish!"8 
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Although Shaw's version of Genesis is quite different in many re­
spects, there is a strong parallel to what Alquist describes as "this first 
couple who have discovered love . . . beloved laughter, the love of 
husband and wife." In Shaw's Eden these phenomena (and many others) 
are also discovered, and words are found for them by the very articulate 
Serpent, who also explains to Eve how they can reproduce their kind. 
(This secret Alquist delicately leaves the robot couple to discover for 
themselves.) Also like the robots, Shaw's Adam and Eve are faced with 
the threat of extinction, for we meet them the morning they discover 
death in the garden. This discovery makes them suddenly terrified for 
the other's safety, and like Primus, Adam is especially protective: "You 
must never put yourself in danger of stumbling," he tells Eve. "I will 
take care of you and bring you what you want. "9 After discovering the 
feelings of uncertainty and jealousy, the two discover (like the robots) 
that they belong to each other, so they invent marriage, and the Serpent, 
like Alquist, supplies the titles "husband" and "wife" (18). 
If we skip from the first to the last play of Shaw's cycle, As Far as 
Thought Can Reach, we see another sort of "first couple" that resembles 
Capek's: the automatons created by Pygmalion. Although physically 
superb, they are morally defective, for the most part, as haughty and 
self-centered as thoroughly spoiled children. When reproached for 
killing their creator, they respond as the Bible's Adam and Eve do 
when reproached for their disobedience: they try to blame each other. 
However, they manage to rise briefly to the level of Helena and Primus 
when the very superior He-Ancient, taking Alquist's role, presents them 
with the same ultimatum: "Now listen," he says, "One of you two is to be 
destroyed. Which of you shall it be?" "Spare her; and kill me," the male 
figure responds. "Kill us both," urges the woman, "How could either of 
us live without the other?" (243). As it happens, they do both die, for 
they are deeply flawed creatures who cannot live among the super­
evolved Ancients, but Shaw's play ends on a note that is as emphatically 
life-affirming as Capek's. Lilith, another character Shaw has appro­
priated from biblical legend and radically reinterpreted, sounds a bit 
like Alquist when she declares, reverently and exultantly, "Of life only is 
there no end; and though of its million starry mansions many are empty 
and many still unbuilt . . . my seed shall one day fill it and master its 
matter to its uttermost confines. And for what may be beyond, the 
eyesight of Lilith is too short. It is enough that there is a beyond" (262). 
Although both plays are in their different ways life-affirming, they 
clearly take opposite positions on the issue of humanity's role in shaping 
its own destiny. Shaw does not believe God could really survey creation 
and declare it "good" in the same sense that Capek means it, which is to 
say "quite good enough for us." Like most utopians, Shaw believed that 
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both humanity and human society needed to be vastly improved and 
that our duty as humans (in his view, gods in embryo) is to strive 
continually toward that end. Shaw expresses this belief in defending "the 
divine force of curiosity" in an earlier preface (to The Doctor's Dilemma): 
I have always despised Adam because he had to be tempted by 
the woman, as she was by the serpent, before he could be 
induced to pluck the apple from the tree ofknowledge. I should 
have swallowed every apple on the tree the moment the owner's 
back was turned. When Gray said "Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis 
folly to be wise," he forgot that it is godlike to be wise; and since 
nobody wants bliss particularly, or could stand more than a very 
brief taste of it if it were attainable, and since everybody, by the 
deepest law of the Life Force, desires to be godlike, it is stupid, 
and indeed blasphemous and despairing, to hope that the thirst 
for knowledge will either diminish or consent to be subordi­
nated to any other end whatsoever. 10 
Capek, conversely, seems to be asserting in R.U.R. that striving to be 
"godlike" is not only ill-advised but downright sinful-a classic expres­
sion of the kind of willfulness and pride that led to our Fall in the first 
place. Capek soon added another anti-utopian play to the argument in 
his next work, The Makroupolous Secret. 
In 1922, the same year that the New York Theatre Guild produced 
Methuselah and R.U.R., Capek's Makroupolous Secret had its debut in 
Prague. Like R.U.R., it was immediately considered in relation to Methu­
selah (especially the third play of Shaw's cycle, The Thing Happens) 
because it demonstrates how extreme longevity would be a curse to 
humanity. Capek was rather insistent in the play's preface that he had 
heard only sketchily of Shaw's play when he was writing his, but the plot 
similarities suggest otherwise. Both plays feature a woman who has 
taken a step toward immortality-each can live for three centuries 
without any decrease in vigor or change in appearance after the first 
forty years or so-and both plays focus on evaluating whether that 
miracle would be a blessing or a curse were it more widespread in the 
race. As before, both playwrights take diametrically opposed positions 
on the desirability of humankind's striving to achieve this miracle. Shaw 
believes our survival absolutely depends on our developing the level of 
maturity and sense of social responsibility that only a very long, vigorous 
life can provide, while Capek insists it is not only ill-advised but down­
right sinful to aspire to more than our traditionally allotted three score 
and ten-Adam and Eve were, after all, driven from Eden to prevent 
172 JULIE A. SPARKS 
their eating from that second forbidden tree, the one that would grant 
eternal life. 
Despite the diametrically opposed themes, however, the two plays 
contain several remarkably similar plot elements. Most striking is the 
exact period of longevity in both plays: three centuries. It really looks as 
if Capek was being clever in pretending to arrive as this figure by 
"coincidence" because Shaw begins the second play of his pentateuch, 
The Gospel of the Brothers Barnabas, with this same coincidence: the two 
brothers who have been developing their plan for the salvation of 
humanity decide independently but simultaneously that we must achieve 
life-spans of three centuries if we are to survive as a species. When 
Conrad bursts into his brother Franklyn's study with this announcement, 
Franklyn says, "Now that is extraordinary. . . . The very last words I 
wrote when you interrupted me were 'at least three centuries' " (37-38). 
Unfortunately, the two are interrupted before Franklyn can answer his 
brother's question, "How did you arrive at it?" Could this be another 
instance of the artists' intuitive synchronity? Or did Capek appropriate 
at least this detail from the "resume" of Shaw's play that he says he read 
in 1921? 
The other plot parallels may simply have followed logically from the 
similar situation depicted. Anyone who lives for a couple of centuries 
would experience similar difficulties and thus could be expected to 
respond with similar stratagems if forced to live among people of 
normal life-spans. Accordingly, we find Shaw's Mrs. Lutestring, who 
survives from the day of the Brothers Barnabas to the distant future of 
the next play, The Thing Happens, describing problems similar to Emilia's. 
Both must periodically stage a death and adopt a new persona to allay 
the suspicions of short-livers; both must suffer the loss of beloved 
friends and family who age and die in the usual way; both finally become 
emotionally detached from their numerous progeny and, indeed, from 
all short-lived people, who begin to seem rather tediously childish; and 
both acquire a mysterious power of inspiring awe and fear in ordinary 
mortals, who cannot help feeling their own inferiority in the presence 
of these majestic, goddess-like women. Perhaps certain other plot details 
are also inevitable, arising from the conflict between the desire for 
eternal youth and the fear of the unknown. Thus, both plays contain 
characters who consider with trepidation how this phenomenal longev­
ity, if it became widespread in the population, would wreck the current 
political structure; both contain moving passages that describe the un­
bearable brevity of the traditional life-span and the great potential for 
human improvement that any significant extension could make possible; 
both plays refer to a race of "supermen"; and both plays include 
characters who are not brave enough to face the prospect of a three­
century life-span. 
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Despite all these similarities, the playwrights come down on opposite 
sides of the question of whether this is a desirable development, whether 
the possibilities for human improvement that greater longevity could 
provide-the striving for a nobler quality of life, even an approach to 
godhead-are worth the risks and the burden involved. In order to 
present their very different answers to this philosophical question, 
the playwrights had to present their heroines' characters somewhat 
differently. Shaw suggests that a longer lifetime would produce wise, 
goddess-like women by describing Mrs. Lutestring as "a handsame woman, 
apparently in the prime of life, with elegant, tense, well held-up figure, and the 
walk of a goddess. Her expression and deportment are grave, swift, decisive, 
awful, unanswerable. She wears a Dianesque tunic ... [T]he men, who rise as 
she enters . .. incline their heads with instinctive awe" (113-14). Her interac­
tion with the short-livers bears out this description of her awful magnifi­
cence and shows that she is quite capable of bearing the grave 
responsibility of establishing and maintaining a utopia. When the rela­
tively ineffectual and shallow president, Burge-Lubin, speculates that 
"The complications must be frightful. Really I hardly know whether I 
do want to live much longer than other people," Mrs. Lutestring replies 
regally, "You can always kill yourself. ... Long life is complicated, and 
even terrible; but it is glorious all the same. I would no more change 
places with an ordinary woman than with a mayfly that lives only an 
hour" ( 119). 
Capek is more terse in his stage directions than Shaw, so we hear of 
Emilia Marty's magnificence only from the other characters, but they all 
rave about her beauty, her charisma, her marvelous singing voice (she is 
an opera diva), and, as with Mrs. Lutestring, the instinctive fear she 
inspires. Even without stage directions, however, one director seems to 
have captured what Shaw describes as the irresistible psychic force that 
longevity would produce in a woman like this. The effect is reported 
precisely in Walter Kerr's review of the 1957 New York revival of the 
play. In describing the scene wherein Emilia is confronted by an old 
lover of hers, now elderly, Kerr says, "Miss [Eileen] Herlie rests on a 
chaise-longue, turned thoroughly away from us. The old sport's eyes 
meet hers. In the intake of a breath, and a few seconds' silence, 
something happens between them-something strong enough to blow 
the frail gallant backward, like a windblown dandelion, into the lap of 
the nearest onlooker.'' 11 Shaw presents a very similar scene in the fourth 
play of the cycle, Tragedy of an Elderly Gentleman, between an ancient 
oracle and some presumptuous short-livers who fall to their knees in 
terror and awe when she is revealed to them. 
Despite these similarities, however, Shaw's and Capek's heroines are 
very different people. We can see just how different Capek's heroine is 
from the "Dianesque" Mrs. Lutestring when Gregor, a character who 
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has been so unfortunate as to have fallen passionately in love with 
Emilia, raves, "I am terrified of you.... There is something dreadful 
about you... . You are vicious, low, awful, you are a callous animal. ... 
Nothing means anything to you. Cold like a knife. As if you'd come out 
of a grave."12 It is significant that while Shaw invokes the imagery of 
Greek mythology-and specifically a goddess "chaste and fair" (al­
though really Athena would have been a more appropriate model}­
Capek presents Emilia as a vampire. Both are immortal and awe­
inspiring, but only one is admirable. While Shaw's heroine works hard, 
devotes herself to the future of humankind, and finds the effort "glori­
ous," Capek's heroine is locked in the tail-chasing aimlessness of narcis­
sism. We are not terribly surprised when we find the other characters 
pitying Emilia her fate, as Gulliver pitied the Struldbruggs, when Emilia 
cries, in the last act, "One should not, should not, should not live so 
long! .. . One cannot stand it. For 100, 130 years, one can go on. But 
then ... then . . . one finds out ... and then one's soul dies." The soul-
withering truth she discovers is that "one cannot believe in anything. 
Anything" (173). Acute ennui has turned to nihilism and the despairing 
conclusion that "People are never better. Nothing can ever be changed. 
Nothing, nothing, nothing ever really matters" (174). Considering how 
Shaw's estimation of modern man had suffered from the grim spectacle 
of World War I, he could never have preserved his essential hopefulness 
had he agreed with Emilia on this point. He had to believe radical 
improvement to be possible or despair over the future of the race 
because, as Stanley Weintraub put it, Shaw had come to believe humanity 
was engaged in a "race between Utopia and catastrophe."1s 
Considering the striking plot similarities, the diametrically opposed 
positions the two plays take on utopian aspirations, and that The Makro­
pulos Secret was published in 1922, a year after Methuselah appeared in 
print, it is easy to see how Capek's play could be so widely assumed to be 
a direct rebuttal of MethuseUJ.h. Capek therefore felt it necessary to insist 
in the preface to his play that he was actually inspired not by Shaw but 
by "the theory of Professor Mecnikov [Metchnikov] . . . that old age is 
autointoxication of the organism." He mentions this, he explains, "be­
cause this winter there appeared a new work by Shaw ... which so far I 
know only from a resume, and which also-Qn a scale apparently much 
more grandiose--treats the question of longevity." 14 He adds, "This 
coincidence in subject is entirely accidental, and, as it would seem from 
the resume, purely superficial, for Bernard Shaw comes to quite the 
opposite conclusions" (112). It should be noted, however, that Capek 
may have first heard of Metchnikov from an earlier Shaw play, The 
Doctor's Dilemma, where Shaw mentions him in discussing the latest 
theories of immunization, in both the play and preface. Since The 
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Doctor's Dilemma was written in 1906 and first translated into German in 
1908, it is reasonable to suppose that Capek may have read it or seen it 
performed before he wrote The Makropulos Secret, whether he would 
later remember the Metchnikov discussion or not. 
Although Capek is quite explicit in pointing out that his position on 
the longevity question differed from Shaw's, he goes on to explain how 
the two playwrights, although one is utopian and the other anti-utopian, 
could both be seen as "optimists." Although he acknowledges that 
"Shaw's thesis will be received as a classical case of optimism" while his 
will be labeled "pessimism," he mildly explains that 
In my comedy I intended, on the contrary, to tell people 
something consoling and optimistic. I do not know if it is 
optimistic to maintain that to live sixty years is bad, while to live 
three hundred years is good; I only think that to declare that a 
life of sixty years (on the average) is adequate and good enough 
is not exactly committing the crime of pessimism.... Perhaps 
there are two kinds of optimism: one which turns away from 
bad things to something better, even dreams; another, which 
searches among bad things for something at least a little better, 
if only dreams. The first looks straight off for paradise; there is 
no finer direction for the human soul. The second searches 
here and there for at least some crumbs of relative good; 
perhaps this effort is not quite without value. (112) 
This is a diplomatic effort to reconcile the two opposing attitudes, and 
indeed some important similarities can be found between the habits of 
thought and theories of their art professed by these otherwise very 
different people. There is, for example, the striking similarity in their 
statements that assert the necessity for artists to reject a simplistic 
absolutism. In his preface to Plays Pleasant, Shaw declares that "the 
obvious conflicts of unmistakable good with unmistakable evil can only 
supply the crude drama of villain and hero, in which some absolute 
point of view is taken, and the dissentients are treated by the dramatist 
as enemies to be piously glorified or indignantly vilified. In such cheap 
wares I do not deal. Even in my unpleasant propagandist plays I have 
allowed every person his or her own point of view, and have, I hope to 
the full extent of my understanding of him, been as sympathetic with 
Sir George Crofts [the "villain" ofMrs Warren's Profession] as with any of 
the more genial and popular characters in the present volume" (3: 111). 
Capek makes a very similar assertion about the kind of morally compli­
cated conflict he wanted to dramatize in R.U.R. After explaining each 
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major character's particular ideological stance and declaring them all to 
be "right," Capek explains that 
the most important thing is ... that all of them are right in the 
plain and moral sense of the word. Each . . . has the deepest 
reasons, material and moral, for his beliefs, and according to his 
lights seeks the greatest happiness for the greatest possible 
number of his fellow-men. I ask whether it is not possible to see 
in the present social conflict of the world an analogous struggle 
between two, three, five , equally serious verities and equally 
generous idealisms? I think . . . this is the most dramatic element 
in modern civilization, that a human truth is opposed to another 
truth no less human, ideal against ideal . . . instead of the 
struggle being, as we are so often told it is, between noble truth 
and vile selfish error. 15 
This agreement on objective relativism for the sake of truth in art did 
not preclude disagreement on other important philosophical issues. 
Nevertheless, Capek's report of his first visit to Shaw's flat in London 
describes the beginning of a friendship that appears to have been warm 
and respectful on both sides. It is also clear that Shaw's pentateuch was 
still in Capek's mind. He describes the great Irishman much as Shaw 
describes his Ancients: "an almost supernatural personality . . .. He looks 
half like God and half like a very malicious satyr, who however, by a 
process of sublimation extending over thousands of years, has lost all 
that is too closely akin to nature."16 He confesses to having felt actually 
afraid since he had "never seen so unusual a being," but he was also 
charmed, concluding that Shaw "sparkles with life and has heaps of 
interesting things to say about himself, about Strindberg, about Rodin, 
and other famous things; to listen to him is a delight coupled with awe" 
(183). After returning to Prague, Capek wrote Shaw a letter urging him 
to "put your interest in our country in order." Referring to their meeting 
in London, Capek repeats his original assessment of Shaw's Czech 
translator, offering to help find a more trustworthy one and inviting 
him to come and see a Prague production ofMan and Superman. A later 
letter indicates that Shaw took this advice about the translator. 17 But 
their mutual friendship and respect did not bring them any closer to 
accord on their basic philosophical disagreement about the legitimacy 
of utopian aspirations, and in 1927 Capek carried the debate back onto 
the stage, producing his most emphatically anti-utopian play, Adam 
the Creator. 
This time there is no questiQn about coincidental influence. Adam the 
Creator is clearly a conscious, deliberate refutation of Shaw's entire 
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utopian oeuvre from his treatment of the Superman, to his faith in 
willed Creative Evolution, to his mystical, human-centered In the Begin­
ning. The play opens with the violent end of the world as we know it 
when the Adam of the title, disgusted with the "petty, miserable human 
race," writes a manifesto proclaiming "all order, all customs and institu­
tions bad, null, and void ... every effort to improve or change the world 
order is cowardly compromise ... life is a bad habit."18 Then he loads 
his Cannon of Negation and blows up the world. The empty wasteland 
that results disconcerts him somewhat, but he concludes defiantly, "Yes, 
it was badly made, and I've abolished it" (15). This remark is not allowed 
to pass: God's voice thunders down a command that as a penalty for his 
presumption, Adam must create the world anew himself, from the clay 
on which he kneels. Still in the grip of Darwinism, Adam hurrumphs, 
"As if one could create life out of clay! It's clear he has no idea of 
modern biology" (17). Yet when life does not appear spontaneously out 
of the clay, as he expects, Adam takes on the role of Creator with relish. 
"Let's skip this monkey-stage of human beings!" he cries, and instead 
sets out to make a "Superman," then changes his mind and makes a 
Superwoman instead, named Eve (19). Here we get a reprise of Henry 
Higgins and Eliza, for once she is completed, the woman turns on her 
creator and refuses to acknowledge his claims on her, prompting Adam 
to complain "Why, I with my own hands created her, and all there is in 
her is my big words; and if you please, she now puts on to me these lofty 
airs!" (28). None of Adam's other creations turns out any better: the 
Nietzschean Ubermensch, Miles, scorns his creator as an inferior crea­
ture and runs off to the hills with Eve; the sweet, womanly little Lilith 
becomes a tediously clinging wife; and Alter Ego, intended as a friend 
and collaborator, becomes a critic and a rival (since he is as opinionated 
and argumentative as Adam). 
Alter Ego proves to be Adam's most significant creation, however, 
because he finally persuades Adam to let him create, too. Operating on 
different artistic principles, Adam and Alter Ego produce two different 
races of men. Adam creates artistic, anarchic individualists while Alter 
Ego manufactures identical, lock-step collectivists who march in step 
and whistle the same tune, the one Alter Ego whistled as he made them. 
This essential dichotomy brings intensified discord into this new world 
because both races have been created with all of mankind's old propen­
sity toward bigotry, so they bicker over which has the greater claim to 
being "real people." Adam's people claim to be "Personalities," "Souls," 
"Images of God," while Alter Ego's declare themselves ''the New World," 
"the Mass," and most crushingly (twisting Shaw's hope-inspired religion 
of Creative Evolution) "creative revolution"! (115). 
These blank myrmidons were not at all what Shaw had in mind when 
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he expounded his theory of Creative Evolution, but Capek, like many 
other anti-utopians of his time, equated any willful reorganization of 
the social order with totalitarian uniformity. This places Capek firmly in 
the mainstream of his anti-utopian contemporaries because, as Lyman 
Tower Sargent points out, "[t]he tendency in this century has been to 
equate utopia with force, violence, and totalitarianism."19 Sargent adds 
that "Much of the original basis for the antiutopian position came 
from anti-communism or anti-fascism. It was transformed first by the 
coalescence of these two positions into an anti-totalitarian position, and 
transformed second by the development of dystopia" (26). Accordingly, 
Capek's play contains a scene that specifically demonstrates the danger 
that utopian efforts might pave the way for powerful tyrants: the scene 
where Miles returns from the hills. This Superman, instead of leading 
the newly created human race to the highest possible intellectual and 
spiritual development, drags it back to the level of the angry ape, 
introducing modern warfare just as Shaw's Cain does in Act II of In the 
Beginning, and as Shaw's Napoleon Cain Adamson continues to threaten 
in the thirty-first century in Tragedy of an Elderly Gentleman. But while 
Shaw introduced the Cain figure only to show an atavistic type of 
barbarian to be resisted and eventually left behind, Capek presents 
Miles (whose name, derived from the Latin word for "soldier," suggests 
his inherently bellicose nature) to help drive home his point that the 
besetting difficulty of changing the world is that we can never eradicate 
the inherent flaws of human nature: hubris, aggression, lust for power 
and glory, and even defeatism and misanthropy. 
While the Cain type of person is subject to the first two flaws, utopian 
aspirants like Adam are subject to the latter two. Like all the would-be 
world-betterers before him, Adam had eagerly written ideas for five 
different kinds of Golden Ages in little notebooks-he names Plato, 
Bakunin, and Marx as inspirations-but he becomes demoralized trying 
to realize his schemes and advises the equally sanguine Alter Ego not to 
bother: "You can write it down so beautifully; you can write down 
whatever you want, but the moment you begin to put it into practice--" 
(84). And that seems to be Capek's principal theme. Capek's play is 
unusual in its expressionistic approach to the subject, but the anti­
utopian use of the Edenic motif is not surprising for the period, for as 
Sargent explains, "Some dystopias . . . can be seen as a continuation of 
the idea of original sin. Ejected from the Garden of Eden, unable to 
return and unable to achieve a secularized version of it, [the anti­
utopians believe] the human race is incapable of utopia" (26). 
But Capek gives the play an optimistic, comic denouement. When 
Adam and Alter Ego find themselves in the position God held at the 
beginning of the play-first denied credit for being Creators, then 
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reproached for the flawed world they produced-they almost decide to 
destroy the world again but are finally won over by a sublime rdigious 
festival of the people (who worship their creators with an abstract, 
slightly garbled tribute to their real genesis). Humbled and uplifted at 
the same time, Adam promises God to leave the world as it is. And God, 
given the last line of the play, says "So will I!" (183). Although Adam the 
Creator failed on the stage, it was translated into English in 1929 and was 
popular as a book, and it seems fair to assume that at this point in their 
acquaintance, Shaw would have received his own copy from the author. 
In 1932 Shaw produced an odd little novella, The Adventures of the 
Black Girl in Her Search for God, wherein he again takes up the issue that 
Adam and God wrangle over in Capek's play and exposes some rhetori­
cal sleights of hand Capek had used in presenting his case. In Shaw's 
novel, an intelligent, inquisitive, clear-eyed African girl meets a succes­
sion of God-figures who represent stages in the evolution of our concep­
tion of the deity. The second of these is the God revealed in the book of 
Job, and the Black Girl naturally asks him Job's question (which is also 
Adam's complaint in Capek's play): "I want to know why, if you really 
made the world, you made it so badly." And God answers according to 
tradition (and Capek): "Who are you, pray, that you should criticize me? 
Can you make a better world yourself? Just try: that's all."20 The Black 
Girl is not abashed as Job and Capek's Adam are. She points out that 
this response is not an answer or an argument, "it's a sneer." She adds 
"I don't mind your laughing at me . .. but you have not told me why 
you did not make the world all good instead of a mixture of good and 
bad.... If I were God there would be no tsetse flies. My people would 
not fall down in fits and have dreadful swellings and commit sins" 
(14). Because he can make no satisfactory answer to this question, she 
concludes that he is no God but an imposter and continues on her quest. 
In the postscript, Shaw affirms this conclusion, asserting that "God's 
attempt at an argument is only a repetition and elaboration of the sneers 
of Elihu, and is so abruptly tacked on to them that one concludes that it 
must be a pious forgery to conceal the fact that the original poem left 
the problem of evil unsolved and Job's criticism unanswered, as indeed 
it remained until Creative Evolution solved it" (90). According to Shaw's 
scheme of development, Capek's deity would probably be classified with 
Micah's, who tells the Black Girl of a God who requires only that we "do 
justice and love mercy and walk humbly with Him." She finds this is a 
great improvement over Job's God, but still insufficient, for he does not 
provide the answer she seeks. "But doing justice and shewing mercy is 
only a small part of life when one is not a baas or a judge. And what is 
the use of walking humbly if you don't know where you are walking to?" 
she asks Micah (23). 
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We cannot know what Capek would have replied to this because he 
died only a few years later, in 1938, and his widow had to burn his 
letters to prevent their falling into the hands of the Nazis and implicating 
Capek's correspondents in his anti-Fascist agitations. But Shaw was not 
finished with the argument. Shaw's last utopian play, Farfetched Fables, 
written almost twenty years after The Black Girl, returns to the biblical 
motifs of Armageddon and the Millennium that the Shaw-Capek debate 
had employed. Despite his steadfast repudiation of Capek's anti-utopi­
anism, Shaw's final vision of utopia synthesizes Capek's appreciation for 
ordinary humankind with more rarefied Shavian aspirations. Shaw 
deprecates Farfetched Fables as a "few crumbs dropped from the literary 
loaves I distributed in my prime," but it seems more than coincidence, 
considering that Capek's Adam had been subtitled "A Comedy in Six 
Scenes and an Epilogue," that Shaw's last utopia takes the form of six 
little fables rather than the three- or one-act plays he usually produced. 
Like Capek's play, Shaw's begins with a vision of an Armageddon that, 
although cataclysmic, is not final: the last four fables show how human 
civilization rebuilds itself from its own ashes. 
Despite these similarities, however, the distinction between utopian 
and anti-utopian remains. While Capek shows civilization revived with 
all its flaws, Shaw depicts one that has evolved onto a somewhat higher 
plane, and this society shares the universe with the Ancients of Methu­
selah who have managed to continue their evolution into disembodied 
spirits, or "thought vortexes," to use Shaw's term. After the initial 
Apocalypse, each fable shows how our development progressed from 
"the dark ages that followed the 20th century," each describing a new 
strategy for world-bettering: an advanced science for measuring and 
classifying human potential, improved diet, and eugenic manipulation 
in the lab to create "the Just Man Made Perfect." The fifth fable revives 
an idea presented at the end of Methuselah, for one of the eugenic 
scientists decides that "we shall never make decent human beings out of 
chemical salts .. . . We must get rid of our physical bodies altogether."21 
Like the Ancients, he longs to be a disembodied spirit, a "vortex in 
thought." It was this theme in Methuselah that led critics to declare Shaw 
a misanthrope since it looks as if he is proposing to empty the universe 
of human life altogether. Yet this fable ends with a forward-looking 
assertion that echoes Lilith's and is, in its own Shavian way, life affirming: 
"The pursuit of knowledge and power will never end" (511 ). 
It may appear at this point that Shaw remains an unrepentant utopian, 
defying Capek's contention that ordinary human life is enough, but the 
final fable is the crucial point in the Shaw-Capek debate because it 
contains a synthesis of their two kinds of optimism-their two versions 
of humanism-and presents the two positions in a way that shows them 
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to be complementary. The last fable is set in a school for advanced 
children where a sort of Socratic schoolmarm conducts a lively anarchic 
debate that ranges through epistemology, history, and biology to evalu­
ate the theory of the Disembodied Races, which holds that some of the 
highly advanced people we saw in the fifth fable did manage to escape 
their bodies to become "Thought Vortexes" although they continue to 
interact with ordinary humans, "penetrating our thick skulls in their 
continual pursuit of knowledge and power, since they need our hands 
and brains as tools in that pursuit" (517). The teacher accounts for the 
problem of evil in the world-the Job question-by explaining that "the 
pursuit of knowledge and power involves the slaughter and destruction 
of everything that opposes it," and the opposition arises because "even 
the vortexes have to do their work by trial and error. They have to learn 
by mistakes as well as by successes" (517). Then one of the thought 
vortexes materializes as "a youth, clothed in feathers like a bird" who 
announces that he is Raphael, "an embodied thought. ... What you call 
the word made flesh" (519). His motive is simple curiosity to "know what 
it is like to be a body," for even among the immortals, "Curiosity never 
dies" (520). After this brief visitation, the curious being vanishes back 
into the infinite, and the ordinary human youths and maidens are sent 
off to read the Book of job for next Friday. Since the theory of the 
Disembodied Races has at least partiaUy explained the pain and evil that 
remain in the world, much of that ancient story's power will, no doubt, 
be lost, but the teacher presents it not as a theological text but as an 
example of clever rhetoric. Here, then, is the most optimistic vision of 
humanity's prospects that Shaw could devise when the destruction of 
Hiroshima had provided a preview of Armageddon and the hope was 
fading, even for an old Fabian like Shaw, that communism could bring 
about a millennia! society. 
Things had looked even grimmer in the final years of Capek's life as 
the Nazis swept through Europe and crushed his country. During a 
period of despair Capek wrote The White Illness (1937), which Harkins 
describes as an anticipation of Fascism's triumph: "half gruesome fan­
tasy, half dystopian image" (150). Yet Capek absolved himself from "the 
charge of pessimism," for he wrote The Mother in 1938, a play that ends 
with a stirring call to defend the ideals of liberty. He sounds even more 
defiantly optimistic in his essay "The Crossroads of Europe," also written 
in 1938, wherein he seems to have joined forces with the utopian 
idealists in his own country, especially T. G. Masaryk, a friend since the 
1920s. With a nationalistic and humanistic fervor that departs radically 
from his usual mild, ironic, understated tone, Capek writes, 
This democratic spirit, this love of liberty and of peace, is part 
and parcel of the very character of the Czechoslovak nation. 
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Over and above that, however, T. G. Masaryk, the Liberator and 
first President ofour Republic, made those things the moral and 
political program ofour people. For him ... politics represented 
a realization of love of our fellow men; in his eyes democracy 
and liberty were based on respect for man, for every man; they 
issued from recognition of his immortal soul and the infinite 
value of human life; for Masaryk the ultimate goal of all honest 
politics and all true statesmanship was to bring about the King­
dom of God on earth . ... 22 
It would be facile to say that his dialogue with Shaw had finally van­
quished Capek's objections to the idea of ordinary humans striving to 
establish a millennia! society without waiting for divine intervention. 
Certainly the influence of Masaryk and the threat of Fascism also had 
their impact. But the dauntless hopefulness expressed here testifies to 
the power of the sort of optimism Shaw's utopian works continued to 
assert. Shaw himself, who lived to see all the brutality of the Holocaust 
and the horror of Hiroshima, retained his stubborn belief in humanity's 
prospects to the end. His final words on the subject, the last lines of the 
"What Is My Religious Faith?" chapter of his autobiographical Sixteen 
Self Sketches, could be taken as a manifesto for all utopians: "Creative 
Evolution can replace us; but meanwhile we must work for our survival 
and development as if we are Creation's last word. Defeatism is the 
wretchedest of policies."28 
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